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THE PENALTY FOR USURY-AN INTERESTING PROBLEM -
Throughout history, the charging of interest has been subject to regula-
tion. The Code of Hammurabi, circa 1800 B.C., includes maximum rates
of interest for loans of grain and silver.' The Old Testament contains
several warnings prohibiting the charging of interest under certain
circumstances. 2 The Biblical penalties resulting from the failure to heed
these warnings were harsh, such as death3 and exclusion from heaven.'
Louisiana law includes numerous limits on interest rates as well as penalty
provisions for violation of these limits. For example, the Louisiana Civil
Code,' the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law,6 the Louisiana Credit Union
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Note, The Federal Monetary Control Act of 1980: A Step Toward Deregulation
of State Usury Laws, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 509, 510 (1981).
2. "if you lend money to My people, to the poor among you, you are not to act
as a creditor to him; you shall not charge him interest." Exodus 22:25 (New American
Standard). "You shall not give him your silver at interest, nor your food for gain." Leviticus
25:37 (New American Standard). " You shall not charge interest to your countrymen: in-
terest on money, food, or anything that may be loaned at interest." Deuteronomy 23:19
(New American Standard).
3. "[Hie lends money on interest and takes increase; will he live? He will not live!
He has committed all these abominations, he will surely be put to death; his blood will
be on his own head." Ezekiel 18:13 (New American Standard).
4. "Who may dwell on Thy holy hill? . . . He [who] does not put out his money
at interest .... ." Psalms 15:1-5 (New American Standard).
5. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1938 & 2924; see infra note II and text accompanying note 19.
6. LA. R.S. 9:3510-:3571 (1983 & Supp. 1984). LA. R.S. 9:3519(A) reads:
A. The maximum loan finance charge for any consumer loan other than one
made with a lender credit card that may be charged, contracted for or received
by a licensed lender or supervised financial organization may equal but not exceed:
(a) Thirty-six percent per year for that portion of the unpaid principal amount
of the loan not exceeding one thousand four hundred dollars;
(b) Twenty-seven percent per year for that portion of the unpaid principal amount
of the loan exceeding one thousand four hundred dollars and not exceeding four
thousand dollars;
(c) Twenty-four percent per year for that portion of the unpaid principal amount
on the loan exceeding four thousand dollars and not exceeding seven thousand
dollars; and
(d) Twenty-one percent per year for that portion of the unpaid principal amount
of the loan exceeding seven thousand dollars.
LA. R.S. 9:3552(A)(l)(a) reads:
A. Violations discovered as a result of written consumer complaint
(1) Intentional violations or violations not caused by good faith errors.
(a) If the court finds that the extender of credit has intentionally or as a
result of error not in good faith violated the provisions of this chapter, the con-
sumer is entitled to a refund of all loan finance charges or credit service charges
and has the right to recover three times the amount of such loan finance charge
or credit service charge together with reasonable attorney's fees. The right to recover
the civil penalty under this subsection accrues only after
(i) written notice is given to the extender of credit by certified mail
addressed to the extender of credit's place of business in which the con-
sumer credit transaction arose;
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Law,' and the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act' all contain interest rate
limitations and/or penalty provisions. The federal government has also
played a role in the regulation of interest with the passage of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.'
With such a myriad of statutes dealing with the regulation of interest
charges, determining which law governs a particular loan or credit sale
can be a difficult task. The applicable provision can depend upon the
type of lender, the purpose of the loan and the size of the loan. However,
a penalty frequently levied on usurious lenders is found in Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:3501.10 While its penalty of interest forfeiture seems
(ii) a copy of such notice is mailed to the extender of credit's agent
for service of process; and
(iii) thirty days have elapsed since receipt of such notice by the ex-
tender of credit, and the violation has not been corrected.
7. LA. R.S. 6:641-:669 (1951 & Supp. 1984). LA. R.S. 6:654(B) reads:
B. Notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary, with respect
to a loan to a member pursuant to an open-end credit, revolving credit, or line
of credit loan account, a credit union may contract to receive and collect a finance
charge, which may be such maximum fixed rates or maximum variable rates of
interest in any amount, as provided for in the credit union bylaws, which have
been approved by the commissioner of financial institutions. The finance charge
may be added to the loan balance on the monthly due date or monthly billing
date or the proportionate part due may be added when a new advance is made.
8. LA. R.S. 6:951-:964 (Supp. 1984). LA. R.S. 6:957(A)(1) reads:
A. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other existing law, a retail in-
stallment transaction entered into on and after September 10, 1982, may include
a finance charge not in excess of the following rates:
Class 1. Any new motor vehicle designated by the manufacturer by a year
model not earlier than the year in which the sale is made, an amount equivalent
to one and one-half percent per month simple interest on the declining balance.
Class 2. Any new motor vehicle not in Class I and any used motor vehicle
designated by the manufacturer by a year model of the same or not more than
two years prior to the year in which the sale is made, an amount equivalent to
two percent per month simple interest on the declining balance.
Class 3. Any used motor vehicle not in Class 2 and designated by the manufac-
turer by a year model not more than four years prior to the year in which the
sale is made, an amount equivalent to two and one-half percent per month simple
interest on the declining balance.
Class 4. Any used motor vehicle not in Class 2 or Class 3 and designated
by the manufacturer by a year model more than four years prior to the year
in which the sale is made, an amount equivalent to two and three-fourths percent
per month simple interest on the declining balance.
LA. R.S. 6:960(A) reads:
A. Any person who shall wilfully and intentionally violate any provision of
this Chapter or engage in the business of a sales finance company in this state
without a license therefor as provided in this Chapter shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hun-
dred dollars or by imprisonment for not to exceed six months in jail, or both.
9. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 501, 94 Stat. 132, 161 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1735f-7 notes (1982)).
10. (1983).
relatively innocuous by Biblical standards, Louisiana courts have searched
for ways to avoid the effect of the provision. One method employed
by the courts will produce an unintended result in light of recent amend-
ments to Civil Code articles 292411 and 1938. The present and future ap-
plication of section 3501 is the focus of this article.
Scope of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3501
The language of section 3501 seems very clear: "Any contract for
the payment of interest in excess of that authorized by law shall result
in the forfeiture of the entire interest so contracted." The scope of the
statute would appear to be very broad, since it encompasses "any con-
tract." It certainly should apply to contracts stipulating a usurious in-
11. Article 2924 reads:
Interest is either legal or conventional. Legal interest is fixed at the following
rates, to wit:
At twelve percent per annum on all sums which are the object of a judicial
demand. Whence this is called judicial interest;
And on sums discounted at banks at the rate established by their charters.
The rate of judicial interest resulting from a lawsuit pending or filed during
the indicated periods shall be as follows. Prior to September 12, 1980, the rate
shall be seven percent per annum. On and after September 12, 1980, until September
11, 1981, the rate shall be ten percent per annum. On and after September 11,
1981, the rate shall be twelve percent per annum.
The amount of the conventional interest cannot exceed twelve percent per an-
num. The same must be fixed in writing; testimonial proof of it is not admitted
in any case.
Except in the cases herein provided, if any person shall pay on any contract
a higher rate of interest than the above, as discount or otherwise, the same may
be sued for and recovered within two years from the time of such payment.
The owner or discounter of any note or bond or other written evidence of debt
for the payment of money, payable to order or bearer or by assignment, shall
have the right to claim and recover the full amount of such note, bond or other
written evidence of debt and all interest not beyond twelve percent per annum
interest that may accrue thereon, notwithstanding that the rate of interest or dis-
count at which the same may be or may have been discounted has been beyond
the rate of twelve percent per annum interest or discount. This provision shall
not apply to the banking institutions of this state in operation under existing laws
or to a consumer credit transaction as defined by the Louisiana Consumer Credit
Law.
The owner of any promissory note, bond, or other written evidence of debt
for the payment of money to order or bearer or transferable by assignment shall
have the right to collect the whole amount of such promissory note, bond, or
other written evidence of debt for the payment of money, notwithstanding such
promissory note, bond, or other written evidence of debt for the payment of money
may include a greater rate of interest or discount than twelve percent per annum;
and, such obligation shall not bear more than twelve percent per annum after
maturity until paid. This provision shall not apply to a consumer credit transac-
tion as defined by the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law. Where usury is a defense
to a suit on a promissory note or other contract of similar character, it is per-
missible for the defendant to show said usury whether same was given by way
of discount or otherwise, by any competent evidence.
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terest rate for which no other penalty provision applies. Contracts which
are governed by the limitations found in Civil Code article 2924 are sub-
ject to section 3501, as article 2924 contains no penalty provision.' 2
However, many other areas of Louisiana law which place limits on in-
terest rates also provide for penalties to usurious lenders. For example,
the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law (LCCL) provides for a penalty of
three times the loan finance charges as well as attorney fees if the bor-
rower can show that the lender committed an intentional violation.' 3 It
has been argued that should a borrower fail to prove an intentional viola-
tion, the penalty provided in section 3501 should still be available as a
remedy.' 4 This argument is supported by the language of section 3501,
which requires no showing of the lender's intent to charge a usurious
interest rate, and by the LCCL, which does not expressly exclude section
3501 as a remedy." Hence, while section 3501 is applicable to loans not
expressly covered by another penalty provision, it may also apply when
a provided for remedy is for some reason unavailable to the borrower.
Section 3501 dictates that the "entire interest" shall be forfeited. The
Louisiana Supreme Court in 1973 decided the case of Thrift Funds v.
Jones, 6 in which the question of what constituted "entire interest" under
section 3501 was considered. The loan in Thrift Funds was found to be
usurious under Civil Code article 2924." The loan included capitalized
interest'" in excess of the conventional rate of interest, which in itself
was not usurious. However, article 2924 places a limitation on the lender
who makes capitalized interest loans: the lender is limited in the amount
of interest he may charge after the note becomes due. Thrift Funds' loan
provided for eight percent interest on the note from the time it was due
until it was paid, which at that time was the maximum allowed by article
2924. Since Thrift Funds added a late charge in addition to the maximum
12. Article 2924 is Louisiana's basic usury provision. However, its application has been
greatly reduced by the passage of various statutes, including the Louisiana Consumer Credit
Law. These statutes have acted to remove most loans from the coverage of article 2924.
13. LA. R.S. 9:3552(A)(l)(a) (1983).
14. Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-
Obligations, 34 LA. L. REV. 231, 244 (1974).
15. But see Note, Usury and Consumer Credit Law in Louisiana, 53 TuL. L. REV.
1439, 1468 (1979).
16. 274 So. 2d 150 (La.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973).
17. Article 2924 allows the charging of an unlimited rate of interest as long as the
interest is capitalized into the face amount of the promissory note. For example, assume
that a borrower secures a loan of $500, but gives to the lender a note for $1000, payable
in one year. The note represents $500 of principal advanced to the borrower, and $500
of capitalized interest. This constitutes an interest rate of 1000 per year, well in excess
of the maximum rate of conventional interest allowed in article 2924 (eight percent at the
time of Thrift Funds' loan), but it is not considered usurious since it is capitalized into
the face amount of the note. Lenders whose loans fall under other statutes, such as the
LCCL, may not benefit from article 2924's sanction of unlimited capitalized interest.
18. See sypra note 17.
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eight percent after maturity of the debt, the court concluded that the lender
had violated article 2924, the late charge being viewed as a form of in-
terest. The court found the loan to be usurious, and looked to section
3501 as the borrower's remedy. The court decided that the "entire in-
terest" forfeiture language of section 3501 included the usurious late
charge, the stipulated eight percent interest from maturity, and the
capitalized interest found in the face amount of the note. Thrift Funds
seems to be in accord with a "plain meaning" construction of the language
found in section 3501. Yet, some courts, apparently viewing the forfeiture
of the "entire interest" as an excessive penalty, have lessened the impact
of section 3501 by looking to Civil Code article 1938.
Reducing the Penalty-The Tarver Rule
Civil Code article 1938 provides that "[a]ll debts shall bear interest
at the rate of twelve percent per annum from the time they become due,
unless otherwise stipulated."'9 Article 1938 would not appear to apply
to a debt for which a usurious rate of interest has been provided, since
the parties did stipulate an interest rate, even though it was usurious.
However, Louisiana courts have at times avoided this interpretation. For
example, in Tarver v. Winn2" the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that
a contract stipulating a usurious rate of interest would be treated as if
the contract contained no provision for interest at all. "The agreement
to pay a greater interest than that allowed by law to be contracted for,
makes that part of the contract null and void, and produces no legal ef-
fect between the parties contracting, and is the same as if no agreement
had been entered into relative to interest."'" Since the usurious rate was
null, there was no rate stipulated in the contract, and the court looked
to the precursor22 of article 1938 to supply an interest rate. The lender
was allowed to recover interest at a rate of five percent per year from
the date the debt became due, which was the rate specified by the statute
when the loan in Tarver was made. The court allowed this recovery even
though it had earlier noted that "such a stipulation [of a usurious in-
terest rate] causes the forfeiture of the entire interest contracted for."2 3
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal has twice applied the same
rule presented in Tarver, " and in 1969, a federal district court citing Tarver
19. Emphasis added.
20. 18 La. Ann. 557 (1866).
21. Id. at 558.
22. 1855 La. Acts, No. 291, § 1. This Act read: "Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana in General Assembly convened, That
all debts shall bear interest at the rate of five per cent. from the time they become due,
unless otherwise stipulated."
23. 18 La. Ann. at 558.
24. W.W. Page & Son v. Russell, 7 La. App. 129 (2d Cir. 1927) (10% interest rate
was found to be usurious, and considered uncollectable; however, the court allowed five
19841
2LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
and the second circuit cases applied article 1938 to provide legal interest
to a usurious lender who had been penalized under section 3501.2
Not all Louisiana courts agree with the use of article 1938 to lessen
the penalty provided for in section 3501. In 1970, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal criticized the federal court's sanction of the Tarver rule:
In our opinion the plain purpose of a legislative declaration
of "the forfeiture of the entire interest" is defeated by substituting
instead a theory that the contract does not stipulate interest and
therefore legal interest is payable. This would not be a forfeiture
of the entire interest, but only a forfeiture of that part of the
stipulated interest above legal interest.
The forfeiture of all interest is a harsh penalty, but it is not
unsuited to the practice sought to be suppressed; and it is the
clear provision of R.S. 9:3501.26
The most recent decision applying the Tarver rule comes out of the
Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal. In Smith v. Ducote," decided
in 1981, the third circuit applied the Tarver rule to a loan found usurious
under article 2924. The court cited the federal court decision and second
circuit decisions as authority. In Smith, the contract stipulated interest
at the rate of ten percent from maturity of the note. The loan was found
to be subject to the provisions of article 2924 and was therefore usurious,
since article 2924, at the time of the Smith loan, limited interest after
maturity to eight percent per year. The court recognized that section 3501
required forfeiture of the entire interest, but applied article 1938, allow-
ing the lender seven percent interest from maturity of the debt. It is worth
noting that Smith was decided after the Thrift Funds case. Thrift Funds
did not concern the use of article 1938 and the Tarver approach. 8
percent interest from maturity of the debt); Green v. Johnson, 14 La. App. 110, 129 So.
384 (2d Cir. 1930) (the court cited both Tarver and Page as it permitted five percent interest
from maturity to a loan which had stipulated a usurious rate of 10%).
25. Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank v. Recile, 302 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. La. 1969). In Meadow
Brook, a loan including capitalized interest also stipulated eight percent interest from the
date of the note. This was considered usurious because article 2924 allows interest on a
capitalized interest loan only from maturity of the debt, not from its inception. After ordering
the forfeiture of all interest, including the capitalized interest, the court awarded legal in-
terest of five percent by using article 1938.
26. DeSalvo v. Finance Funds Group, 252 So. 2d 498, 501 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
27. 398 So. 2d 190 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 405 So. 2d 531 (1981).
28. When the court in Thrift Funds included capitalized interest within the coverage
of LA. R.S. 9:3501, the remaining amount due on the note was less than $300. Loans of
less than $300 were covered by the now repealed Louisiana Small Loan Law, LA. R.S.
6:571-:593 (1951). The Louisiana Small Loan Law provided for forfeiture of the entire prin-
cipal and interest of loans found to be usurious under the Law. Therefore, the court effec-
tively voided the entire loan and there was no principal balance upon which to apply article
1938 and the Tarver approach.
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However, Thrift Funds clearly stands for the proposition that section 3501
is to be construed most favorably to the borrower, since the supreme court
considered all forms of interest, including capitalized interest, to be covered
by the forfeiture provision of section 3501. In spite of the clear implica-
tion of Thrift Funds favoring borrowers, the third circuit, by continuing
to apply the Tarver rule, has sanctioned the partial avoidance of the
penalty provided by section 3501.
It cannot be denied that the usurious lender was penalized under sec-
tion 3501 even though the Tarver rule was applied. Under the facts of
Smith, a usurious rate of ten percent was reduced to the rate found in
article 1938, or seven percent at that time. The loan in Smith was subject
to article 2924, which allowed up to an eight percent rate; consequently,
the lender in Smith ended up receiving seven percent when he could have
legally contracted for eight percent. Therefore, even using the Tarver ap-
proach, the legal lender enjoyed an advantage over the usurious lender,
provided the usurious rate was challenged by the borrower and provided
the legal lender charged the maximum allowable rate.
This advantage might be said to encourage compliance with the law.
Yet, for many lenders the risk of losing one percent interest may not
outweigh the possible gains received from an unchallenged usurious rate.2 9
That issue is moot however, as the legislature has since changed the in-
terest rates found in articles 2924 and 1938 and, thereby, completely
removed the advantage a legitimate lender held over a challenged usurious
lender for a Smith-type loan (no capitalized interest) when the Tarver rule
is applied.
The Tarver Rule Today
In 1980, the legislature raised the legal rate of interest found in arti-
cle 1938 to ten percent.3" In 1981 it was again raised, this time to twelve
percent.' Article 2924 was also amended in 1981. However, the legislature
passed two acts amending article 2924 which contain conflicting
provisions.3" One of the acts left the maximum conventional rate of in-
terest at eight percent," but the other raised the rate to twelve percent.34
29. The loan in Smith contained no capitalized interest. The penalty to usurious lenders
would of course be greater if capitalized interest had to be forfeited as required by Thrift
Funds.
30. 1980 La. Acts, No. 402, § 1.
31. 1981 La. Acts, No. 574, § I & No. 639, § 1. There was no conflict in the provi-
sions of these two acts amending article 1938.
32. Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Obligations, 42 LA. L. REV. 388,
389 (1982).
33. 1981 La. Acts, No. 574, § I.
34. 1981 La: Acts, No. 639, § I.
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In 1982, the legislature tried again, this time installing twelve percent as
the maximum conventional rate.3"
In 1861, when the loan in Tarver was made, a legal lender enjoyed
a maximum three percent greater return than a penalized usurious lender
after article 1938 was applied.36 In 1979, when the loan in Smith was
made, the advantage had decreased to a maximum of one percent. Yet,
for a loan subject to article 2924 made in December 1980, the legal lender
would actually be penalized for obeying the law. The usurious lender,
after having the illegal rate excised from the contract, would receive ten
percent after maturity upon application of article 1938 and the Tarver
rule, which is two percent greater than the maximum rate allowed by ar-
ticle 2924. Under the present law, the legal lender enjoys no advantage
over a penalized usurious lender, since both rates now stand at twelve
percent.
Conclusion
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Thrift Funds made it clear that Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 9:3501 was intended to be a harsh penalty to the
usurious lender. The Tarver approach, especially in light of the present
interest rates found in Civil Code articles 2924 and 1938, is not consistent
with this view. The penalized usurious lender will still receive twelve per-
cent interest after application of article 1938, which equals the maximum
rate the law abiding lender may charge for loans subject to article 2924.
If Louisiana courts persist in applying Tarver, the legislature should move
to prevent such an application. This could be achieved through amend-
ment of section 3501 to forbid the imposition of legal interest on a loan
found to be usurious. Such a change would create more consistent ap-
plication of section 3501 statewide and provide significant incentive for
lenders to observe the interest rate limitations of article 2924.
Allen Dale Darden
35. 1982 La. Acts, No. 142, § 1.
36. The maximum benefit to the legal lender is determined by subtracting the rate found
in article 1938 from the maximum allowed rate in article 2924. The rates in effect during
the Tarver and Smith loans are shown below as well as situations resulting from recent
amendments to articles 1938 and 2924.
Article 2924
Article 1938 Maximum Conventional
Date Percentage Rate Percentage Rate
1861 (Tarver) 5 8
Dec. 1979 (Smith) 7 8
Dec. 1980 10 8
Dec. 1981 12 8 (Act 574), 12 (Act 639)
Dec. 1982 12 12
